Abstract: We present a novel secure search protocol on data and queries encrypted with Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). Our protocol enables organizations (client) to (1) securely upload an unsorted data array . . . , x[n]) to an untrusted honest-butcurious sever, where data may be uploaded over time and from multiple data-sources; and (2) securely issue repeated search queries q for retrieving the first element (i * , x[i * ]) satisfying an agreed matching crite-
Introduction
Following the rapid advancement and widespread availability of cloud computing it is a common practice to outsource data storage and computations to cloud providers. Placing cleartext (i.e unencrypted) data on the cloud compromises data security. To regain data privacy one could encrypt the data prior to uploading to the cloud. However, if using standard encryption (e.g. AES), this solution nullifies the benefits of cloud computing: when given only ciphertexts the cloud provider cannot process the underlying cleartext data in any meaningful way.
by a polynomial over a finite ring (i.e. by repeated application of homomorphic-addition and homomorphicmultiplication for that ring). For example, for data in binary representation, bitwise operations on plaintext bits (addition and multiplication modulo 2) can be replaced by their homomorphic counterparts on encrypted bits (homomorphic-addition and homomorphicmultiplication).
Key factors influencing the running-time of such homomorphic computations are the degree and overall multiplications of the polynomial. Leading to the main two constraints in designing algorithms that compute on FHE encrypted data: they must be realized by a polynomial of low degree and low amount of overall multiplications.
Note that this FHE approach for securely outsourcing to the server the computation of y = f (x) has the benefits of requiring only a single round of communication, and with low communication bandwidth (communicating 
only the encrypted input [[x]] and output [[y]]).
Furthermore, the server in this protocol learns no new information about x or y (assuming the FHE is semantically secure).
Secure search is a fundamental computational problem, useful in numerous data analysis and retrieval tasks. An abundance of proposed solutions were presented to solve it using different cryptographic tools (see Section 1.1 and Tables 1-2 ). In particular, Gentry [22, 23] proposed using FHE to securely search on encrypted data.
In this work we address the natural and simple formulation for secure search on FHE encrypted data (secure search) as considered by [2] : Secure search is a two party protocol between a server and a client. The server holds an unsorted array [[x] ] = [[x [1] ]], . . . , [[x[n] ]] of encrypted elements (not necessarily distinct) that were previously encrypted and uploaded by the client, as well as a specification of a predicate IsMatch(a, b) ∈ {0, 1} specifying the matching condition. The client submits encrypted queries [[q] ] to the server in order to retrieve the first matching element. The server returns to the client the encrypted index and element pair Restrictions on protocols. Note that the above secure search formulation, as addressed in this work, focuses on protocols that involve (a) a single server, and where the client-server interaction is of (b) a single round, and (c) low communication complexity. Furthermore, (d) no initial setup is performed on x except for encrypting it element-by-element (each element encrypted bit-by-bit) and uploading the resulting ciphertexts to the server.
We point out that the latter condition, among other things, prevents speeding up the search by using standard data structures such as search-trees, hash-tables, or sorted arrays (on top of, or instead of, the encrypted unsorted array [[x] ]). A linear scan lower bound is thus implied by the addressed formulation, even if we were to search on clear-text data. This restriction is nonetheless motivated by many use-cases, as discussed next.
Use-cases motivating the aforementioned no-setup restriction arise in settings where, for example:
-Matching criteria are unknown in advance, thus precluding appropriate indexing or sorting at setup; -High dimensional range queries, where index size is exponential in the number attributes and infeasible to compute or store; -Streaming data with client discarding each element immediately after encrypting and uploading to the server, thus precluding client's setup or maintenance of the desired data-structures (and where for the server, seeing only ciphertexts, secure maintenance of advanced data structures seems even harder than secure search); -Low capacity clients that are too weak to run setup over the entire cleartext array prior to encrypting and uploading it to the server; -Fragmented data uploaded to the server from multiple distinct client endpoints (data-sources) with no single endpoint that can perform setup over the entire cleartext data. The single-round and low-communication restrictions are motivated by use-cases in settings where communication is a major bottleneck, e.g. in being intermittent or unreliable, or where communicating is with datasources that are mostly offline, or have restricted battery capacity as in sensors-networks or some Internetof-Things (IoT) devices.
The single server restriction is motivated, not only by the simplicity of such architecture, but also by its stronger security guarantee: requiring no non-collusion assumption on servers.
Threat model. We address computationally-bounded semi-honest adversaries that follow the protocol but may try to learn additional information. Our security requirement is that adversaries controlling the server cannot distinguish between two adversarially-chosen equal size queries or data arrays. See Section 3.3.
The leakage of our protocols include only size information (specifically, upper-bounds on array size, elements' sizes, number of queries, and queries' sizes); see detailed leakage discussion in section 3.3.
Prior Works
We survey related works, focusing primarily on works addressing similar secure-search formulation as addressed in this work: single-server, single-round, lowcommunication and no-setup. See Tables 1-2.
Secure Search on FHE Encrypted Data
The most relevant works are those addressing the same secure-search formulation as considered in our work (aka, secure search on FHE encrypted data); See above and Definition 3.1.
Folklore solutions for secure search on FHE encrypted data suffered from inefficient server runtime due to evaluating degree Ω (n) polynomials, for n the number of elements; see discussion in [2] .
SPiRiT. The prior state-of-the-art for secure-search on FHE encrypted data appeared in a recent work of Akavia, Feldman and Shaul CCS'2018 [2] , where the server evaluates a polynomial of logarithmic degree log 3 n (instead of degree at least linear in the folklore solution). Their work proposes both a deterministic and a randomized variant. Their deterministic variant (SPiRiT Det.) uses modern data summarization techniques known as sketches [60] alongside multi-ring simultaneous evaluations of their search polynomial to retrieve a polylogarithmic short list of candidates for the first matching element. This novel technique essentially reduces the degree of the polynomial evaluated by the server from linear to poly-logarithmic in the number of elements n.
Their randomized variant (SPiRiT Rand.) offers an efficiency improvement by working over a single random ring instead of several different rings. The disadvantage of this randomized variant is that it achieves an error probability that is only polynomially small in n (i.e., noticeable error) rather than a negligible error probability.
Other Related Works
We next discuss other related methods and works.
Setup vs. no-setup -server's efficiency gap. There is a major efficiency gap between works allowing initial setup to works disallowing setup, as in our work. This is because setup allows sub-linear search time (e.g. using indexing, search trees or hash table), whereas disallowing setup necessitates -even on cleartext data-a linear scan of the data. Our work focuses on the no-setup case.
Secure two-party computation (2PC w/o FHE). Seminal works dating back to the 1980s [26, 62] showed that two parties can compute any polynomial-time computable function of their private inputs via an interactive protocol that reveals no information beyond what can be inferred from the function's output. In particular, parties can securely compute the search functionality.
However, secure two-party protocols preceding the constructions of FHE schemes (2PC w/o FHE) suffer from a communication complexity, and hence also the client's time, grows with the complexity of the computed function. This is in contrast to growing only with the input and output sizes |q| + |(i,
We note that, while we focus on secure search in the two parties settings (client and a single server), promising results have been shown for settings where the server can be partitioned into several non-colluding entities that secret-share the data; a comprehensive survey of such works is beyond our scope. A few examples include [3, 5, 59 ], all addressing search on cleartext data held by the multiple servers, namely, protecting the query but not the data against the server.
Searchable Encryption (SE) focuses on inherent efficiency versus security trade-off when searching on encrypted data. Specifically SE focuses on achieving sublinear search time. Main primitives for SE include searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) and public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) with schemes first introduced by Song et al. [56] and Boneh et al. [4] respectively. See also [6] for a thorough survey.
To achieve sublinear time SE incorporates setup such as sorting, indexing or usage of auxiliary data structures. Furthermore SE deliberately leaks information to enable highly efficient search over encrypted data. This leakage typically includes the access pattern (which elements match a given keyword) and/or search pattern (whether different queries were generated for the same searched keyword).
Starting with the work of [17] , research on SE formalized security by defining a leakage profile that characterizes the information an adversary may learn. In some cases, an adversary can exploit a scheme's leakage to completely reveal the content of elements and queries it comes across. See discussions and example attacks in [1, 10, 25, 29, 30, 33, 42, 47, 64] . [1, 10, 25, 29, 30, 33, 47, 64] . (ii) SE deliberately leaks information to enable highly efficient search over encrypted data, see additional info in [6] . (iii) Sub-linear client, server and communication complexity in |x|.
Security
In contrast, in FHE based solutions such as our work there is no leakage other than size information; see detailed leakage discussion in Section 3.3.
SE using Oblivious RAM (SE+ORAM).
ORAM [27] is a cryptographic primitive that allows a client to conceal its access pattern to a remote storage held by the server via continuous re-shuffling of a dedicated structure and re-encryption of the data as it is being accessed. Typical ORAM constructions (e.g. [51, 57] ) achieve polylogarithmic server run-time by requiring the client to perform a "download-decrypt-compute-encrypt-upload" each round, for at least O (log n) rounds.
ORAM can be combined with other techniques to suppress leakage in SE. This was demonstrated in several recent works, including: TWORAM [21] in which ORAM is utilized together with garbled circuits [61] to hide search and access patterns while achieving constant number of rounds; and [34] that provides generic compilers that suppress leakage in SE schemes by using Square-Root ORAM [27] . ment to know the physical address i of the sought element x [i] , and allow instead to retrieve elements using keywords search. These works however address different settings than our work: their server holds unencrypted data and performs setup on that data to produce auxiliary data-structures used to speedup search (in contrast to the server's holding encrypted data and performing no-setup in our work).
Several disadvantage of this PIR-by-keyword approach make it unsuitable for the use-cases and settings considered in our work: (1) Their server holds unencrypted data, offering no data protection against the server. This is inherent for their setup, as efficient setup on encrypted data is a challenging problem not addressed by these works. 1 (2) They require setup for producing their data-structures, which is unsuitable for use-cases where setup is disallowed or infeasible; See use-cases examples above. (3) Their search-space is restricted by the initial setup choices, e.g., the keywords used in producing their index [11, 50] .
In contrast, in our work (1) Data is encrypted by the client to guarantee data protection against server. (2) No initial setup or maintenance of additional data structures is required, neither by the server nor by the client. (3) We enable arbitrary matching criteria to be chosen by the client, on the fly, for each query.
Private Set Intersection (PSI) [20] enables two parties each holding a private set to securely compute the intersection of their sets. PSI protocols were constructed using various cryptographic primitives (e.g. [37, 45, 46] , including FHE [12] ). PSI protocols can be employed to solve the decision problem of whether the lookup value (size 1 set) appears in the data array (size n set); however, with server holding unencrypted data.
Secure Pattern Matching (SPM) on FHE encrypted data [13, 14, 35, 36, 40, 58, 63] , given an encrypted lookup value, returns a vector of n ciphertexts (c 1 , . . . , c n ), for n the number of elements, where c i indicates whether the ith data element is a match to the lookup value (or sometimes returning only a YES/NO answer of whether a match exists). The main drawback of these protocols is that the communication complexity and client's running time are proportional to the number of stored elements Ω(n).
Our Contributions
In this work we present a new and improved solution for secure search on FHE encrypted data, analyze its efficiency compared to the prior state-of-the-art and demonstrate its concrete run-time performance by providing an implementation (built on top of HElib C++ library [31] ) together with extensive experiments.
Our secure-search protocol is a single-server, singleround, low-communication protocol that requires no initial setup or maintenance of additional data-structures.
Our protocol is compatible with generic matching criteria, such as exact and wild-card matching; similarity search in metric spaces, e.g., with Hamming/Euclidean/Edit distance; Boolean and range queries; and so forth. See Section 5 for specific instantiations examples; efficiency improvements via universal hashing; and employment for fetch-next queries.
The client's complexity is optimal in the sense of only encrypting the input and decrypting the output. The communication consists only of the encrypted input and output. The server sees only ciphertexts for both data and queries, encrypted with FHE in a black-box fashion and compatible with all known FHE candidates. The server evaluates a search polynomial over the encrypted data and encrypted query. This polynomial for computing both index i * and element x[i * ] is of degree log(n/ε) · d and overall multiplication n (log(n/ε) + µ + w). Here n is the number of data elements, ε the failure probability, w the binary representation length of x[i * ], and d, µ the degree and overall multiplications respectively for the polynomial realizing the matching criterion. See Table 3 .
The security guarantee against semi-honest adversaries controlling the server is that our protocol leaks no information on data and queries, except for size information (aka, full-security). Namely, the leakage profile consists solely of upper bounds on the counts and sizes of queries and data elements. In particular, the adversary cannot tell whether two queries are for the same keyword, or whether the client issued a "fresh" query or a "fetch-next" query, etcetera. See Section 3.3.
Comparison to prior works. We next compare our protocol to prior works on secure search, focusing on single-server, single-round protocols, and discussing both works that allow and disallow setup; See Table 1 and Table 2 , respectively.
Our work is incomparable to works allowing setup; See SE, SE+ORAM and PIR-by-Keywords in Section 1.1.2. On the one hand, setup enables attaining search with sub-linear server complexity, which is impossible without setup even on cleartext data and query. On the other hand, we attain a stronger security guarantee of hiding all the following: data content, query content, access pattern, and search pattern; in contrast to leaking at least some of the former in the aforementioned works; See Table 1 .
Our work strictly improves over prior secure-search works that disallow setup (see Folklore, SPiRiT, 2PC w/o FHE, PIR, PSI and PSM in Section 1.1), in the following sense. Our secure-search protocol is the first to simultaneously attain all desired properties that follows (Properties 1-10, Section 3.2): full security (i.e., completely hiding all the following: query content, data elements content, search pattern, access pattern); efficient client and communication (i.e., polynomial in input and output size, and not in the time to compute the search functionality), single and efficient server (in the sense of evaluating over encrypted data a polynomial of degree poly-logarithmic in the number of data elements); unrestricted search functionality; retrieval of both index and element; post-processing free; negligible error probability; and compatibility with all current FHE schemes. In contrast, all prior secure search solutions achieve only a strict subset of these properties. See Table 2 .
In particular, when comparing to the prior state-of-the-art secure-search on FHE encrypted data (SPiRiT) [2] our protocol offers the following contributions: Contribution 1. Our protocol simultaneously achieves both the properties of post-processing free client and negligible error probability. In contrast, the protocols of [2] achieve either post-processing free client or negligible error probability, but not both. Simultaneously achieving both properties, as in our work, is highly motivated as it allows the server to employ secure search as a sub-component in a larger computation without interaction with the client.
Contribution 2.
Our secure search solution is asymptotically faster than [2] , in attaining: (1) Optimal client run-time in the sense of requiring only encrypting the input and decrypting the output. (2) Considerable improvement of the server's run-time: we reduce the degree of the evaluated polynomial from cubic to linear in log n, and from linear to logarithmic in 1/ε, and reduce the overall multiplications by up to log n factor. See Table 3 .
Contribution 3.
Our secure search solution requires computations solely over GF(2) (instead of GF(p) for primes p > 2 in [2] ). This leads to compatibility with all currently known candidate FHE schemes including GSW [24] , unlike [2] . This also allows further run-time speedup when using current FHE schemes implementations, including HElib [31] that implements BGV [7] scheme. The reason for the speedup is that in all current FHE schemes, working over GF(p) for larger primes p > 2 causes a general slowdown of all the homomorphic operations and size inflation of the keys and ciphertexts.
Contribution 4.
Our secure search solution is concretely faster than [2] by an order of magnitude. This is demonstrated by our implementation, based on the FHE HElib C++ library [31] , and our extensive run-time benchmarks experiments, performed on a mid-range Linux server of 16 CPU cores and 16GB RAM. A few examples of comparing our results on same server and with similar parameters for bits per element, execution time and error probability follow; See more details in Section B.3.
(i) We securely search on ≈ 3 × 10 6 (in contrast to ≈ 0.2×10 6 for SPiRiT) 16-bit elements in 4.5 hours, with error probability 2 −80 . (ii) We securely search on ≈ 3 × 10 6 (in contrast to ≈ 0.3 × 10 6 for SPiRiT) 16-bit elements in 1 hour, with error probability 1/2. (iii) We securely search on ≈ 1 × 10 6 (in contrast to running out of RAM and being unable to complete the experiment for SPiRiT) 64-bit elements in 1 hour, with error probability 1/2. (iv) We securely search on > 10 × 10 6 (in contrast ≈ 1.5 × 10 6 for SPiRiT) 1-bit elements in 1 hour, with error probability 1/2.
Our Techniques Highlights
When considering secure search over unsorted FHE encrypted data, approaches like binary-search are rejected immediately. The approach proposed by Akavia et. al. [2] for solving secure search on FHE encrypted array includes the following steps: (1) Obtaining a binary array of indicators after executing the desired IsMatch predicate between the given query and each array element; (2) Calculating an array of prefix-sums of the array of binary indicators; (3) Transforming the prefix-sums array to a binary step-function array with value 1 at every nonzero prefix-sum, namely, the first 1 bit is in the index of the first match; (4) Transforming the step-function array to a selector array where only the index of the first match contains 1 (and all other indices contain 0); (5) Utilizing this selector array to calculate and return this first match (index and element). Table 3 . Complexity comparison of first match index (i * ) computation phase between SPiRiT (rows (i)-(ii)) vs. our work (rows (iii)-(v)). Notations: n -array size; ε -failure probability; d, µ -degree and overall multiplications of IsMatch; k = log 2 n/ log log n; α = O (log(1/ε)); c -a constant depending on the density of prime numbers.
• Server's Degree,
• log(n)
Realizing this approach however is challenging:
Step (2) (computing prefix-sums) has high degree if working with binary plaintext space and using standard addition circuits such as full-adders.
Step (3) (zero-testing each prefix-sum) has high degree if working over plaintext spaces larger than the array size and utilizing Fermat's Little Theorem for the zero-test.
To address this challenge Akavia et. al. [2] propose combining steps (2)-(3) above to a single probabilistic step that returns the required step-function (albeit, with noticeable error probability). They later show how to eliminate the error using few repetitions over multiple rings GF(p) for p > 2 together with client postprocessing for selecting the correct result.
To avoid the aforementioned post-processing we propose an alternative for the probabilistic test combining steps (2)+(3). First, we make the straightforward observation that instead of testing if the sum of binary indicators is zero (as done in [2] ), we can compute the logical-OR of these indicator values. However, this would result in high degree, as the logical-OR over n variables has degree n. Next, to reduce the degree, we employ the method of Razborov and Smolenski [48, 55] for low-degree approximation of the logical-OR function. This method yields a polynomial of degree logarithmic in both n and 1/ε, for ε the failure probability.
Elaborating on the above, the Razborov-Smolenski method is applicable in GF(q) for any q ≥ 2; we apply it with q = 2 on all k-th prefix v [1] , . . . , v[k] ∈ {0, 1} k of the aforementioned vector of n binary indicator values. Their low-degree approximation for OR v [1] , . . . , v[k] ∈ {0, 1} is computed as follows. First, for N (ε) = log 2 (n/ε) uniformly random i.i.d. r 1 , . . . , r N (ε) ∈ {0, 1} n , we compute the parity of the corresponding random subset of entries,
The parity bit p(r j ) is always zero when v = 0 k and it is one with probability half when v = 0 k . Next, we compute the OR of these parity values using the standard degree N (ε) polynomial for the logical-OR of N (ε) binary values:
This is equal to OR(v[1], . . . , v[k]
) with probability 1− ε n . We note that the Razborov's and Smolenski's [48, 55] approximation method has numerous uses in computer science. In particular, in the context of secure search Barkol and Ishai [3] , building on [32, 48, 55] , gave a generic transformation from constant-depth unbounded fan-in boolean circuits to low-degree polynomials. They employ their technique for secure multi-party computation of common search functionalities; albeit, in settings of multiple-servers holding unencrypted data (cf. single-server holding encrypted data in our work).
Article Road-map
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Preliminary definitions and notations in Section 2; Problem statement and threat model in Section 3; Our protocol and the main theorem in Section 4; Instantiations of IsMatch demonstrating performance and functionality enhancements and extensions in Sections 5-6; Conclusions in Section 7. We have moved to the appendix protocols summary (Appendix A), and detailed experimental results (Appendix B).
Preliminaries
We state some preliminary notations and definitions.
For natural numbers k < n,
denotes its i-th bit. We follow the convention of enumerating array entries starting from entry number 1 (not 0), unless stated otherwise. For matrix M the element in row i and column j will be denoted as
and |v| the size (length, dimension) of v (= n).
For k, n ∈ N, denote by r 1 , . . . , r k ←$ {0, 1} n the sampling of k arrays independently at random from the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n . As standard, PPT denotes probabilistic polynomial time; and a function ν : N → R is called negligible in κ, denoted negl(κ), if for every constant c > 0 there exists n 0 such that for all n > n 0 , ν(n) < κ −c .
Definition 2.1 (FHE).
A leveled homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme is defined by a quadruple of PPT algorithms FHE = (KGen, Enc, Dec, Eval) as follows.
-Key generation. (pk, sk) ← KGen(1 κ , 1 L ) takes a security parameter κ and a circuit depth upper-bound L, and outputs public key pk and secret key sk.
and a message b ∈ {0, 1}, and outputs a ciphertext 
represented as an arithmetic circuit over GF (2) and a set of t ciphertexts
. . , x[t]). As a shorthand notation we write
We will use the standard equality operator, for a, b ∈ {0, 1} w , of degree w and w − 1 overall multiplications:
We will also use the standard "greater than" operator (a > b), for a, b ∈ {0, 1} w , of degree w + 1 and 2w overall multiplications:
Problem Statement
Suppose a client (Alice) wants to use a server (cloud service provider, Bob) for data storage, management and retrieval (Search, Insert, Update, Delete). To protect her privacy Alice uploads only encrypted data to the cloud. She encrypts it using FHE so that Bob has processing capabilities on the data, with single round and low communication protocols that hide Alice's data, queries, returned results and access pattern from Bob.
Secure-Search on Encrypted Data
In this paper we focus on the problem of setup-free secure-search on FHE encrypted data, following [2] ; see 
We note that returning a fixed number of matches is inherent in the FHE model. This is because the processing server has to be oblivious of the query, and hence the length of the result has to be the same for every query.
We also would like to point out that above definition does not prevent the client from retrieving multiple matches to a given query. The client can retrieve additional matches by issuing "fetch-next" queries (cf. Section 5.6). This is done without introducing any leakage and without revealing whether "fresh" queries or Setup-free secure-search protocol employing a solution to the above secure search problem follows (cf. Figure 1 Furthermore, Alice could be instantiated by multiple parties with distinct roles: a key generation authority in Step 1, and multiple data-sources and search-clients in Steps 2 and 3 respectively, where the key generation authority sends pk to the data-sources and server, and sends pk, sk to the search-clients.
Generic IsMatch. In order for secure search to be applicable to versatile settings we emphasize that it can be instantiated with various IsMatch predicates: any predicate that when evaluated on two elements a, b, for a from the space of data elements and b from the space of queries, returns a binary indicator accepting value IsMatch(a, b) = 1 if a, b are considered a match in the context of the given settings (0 otherwise). The server's complexity depends on the complexity of the IsMatch predicate.
Desired Properties
We define properties desired from a secure search protocol (following [2] ); see Tables 1-2: 1. 
Threat Model
The untrusted party in our scenario is the honest-butcurious (also called, semi-honest) and computationallybounded adversary controlling the server (as in the case of hacked cloud servers). Semi-honest means, as standard, that the adversary follow the protocol, but may try to learn sensitive information. Namely, for the up- We mention that there is no need to consider adversaries controlling the client as it can trivially simulate the entire protocols (Upload, Search) by herself. This is because the server's role is not to provide input or receive output, but rather to take the bulk of computational burden off the client.
Our security requirement is that if the client issues the protocol with one of two adversarially-chosen equal size queries q (0) , q (1) (similarly, arrays x (0) , x (1) ), the adversary controlling the server cannot distinguish between them; see the formal attack games below.
Definition 3.2 (Full security). We say that an upload and search protocol provides full security if every PPT semi-honest adversary A controlling the server has no more than a negligible advantage Adv(A, FHE, κ) = negl(κ) in winning the attack games on query or data (as specified below).
Attack on query (respectively, data). The attack games involve the adversary A and a challenger C, both given the FHE scheme FHE = (KGen, Enc, Dec, Eval) and the security parameter κ, proceeding as follows.
1. C executes the key generation step (Step I, Figure 3 ) to obtain (pk, sk) ←$ KGen(1 κ ), and sends pk to A. 2. A chooses parameters n, w, w for array size, elements size, and query size, respectively; generates and sends to C the tuple (x, q (0) , q (1) ) for x an array of n elements of size w, and q (0) , q (1) queries of size w (respectively, the tuple (x (0) , x (1) , q) for arrays x (0) , x (1) and query q of sizes as specified above). 3. C samples b ←$ {0, 1} uniformly at random. 4. C and A execute the upload and search protocols (
Step II-III, Figure 3 ) playing the roles of client and server respectively. The client's input is x and q (b) (respectively, x (b) and q); the server has no input. 5. A sends b ∈ {0, 1} to C, and wins if b = b.
The advantage of A in the search attack on query (respectively, data) is defined to be
We remark that, since A holds pk, he can simulate on its own the upload step for additional data entries x of its choice. Likewise, since A holds x, q (0) , q (1) (respectively, x (0) , x (1) , q), he can simulate on its own the search stepexcluding the client's final decryption step-for whatever and as many queries q as A wishes, including queries q (0) , q (1) (respectively, q) . These upload and search steps can occur both before and after the challenge.
Full security leakage profile discussion. Full security implies that the adversary participating in the protocol does not learn new information on data, queries, and search outcomes, other than the following size information: (1) plaintext space; (2) array size upper-bound; (3) element size upper-bound; (4) overall count of executed queries. This holds both for data-at-rest (upload) and data-in-use (search).
In particular, the protocol hides access-patterns to prevent, for example, identifying frequently searched data elements; and hides search-patterns to prevent inferring from search outcomes whether two searches use related query values. The overall count of executed queries does not reveal any information regarding the content or distribution of stored elements; and the server is unable to distinguish between "fresh" queries and "fetch-next" queries (cf. Section 5.6).
Secure Search
We specify our secure search protocol (see Figures 3-4 , Section A) that we name: Binary Raffle Protocol.
This section is organized as follows. The simple keys generation and data upload steps are in Sections 4.1-4.2; the secure search step, which is the heart of this work, in Section 4.3; and our main theorem in Section 4.4.
Keys Generation Step
In the keys generation step the client executes the key generation algorithm of the leveled scheme FHE = (KGen, Enc, Dec, Eval) (see Definition 2) . The input to the KGen algorithm are the security parameter κ and the level L = log 2 (d) for d the degree of the secure search polynomial (see Section 4.3 below).
In details, the level L depends on the following upper-bounds: (1) error probability ε; (2) array size n; (3) degree of the desired matching polynomial d IsMatch . Specifically it needs to be set to L = log log(n/ε) + log(d IsMatch ) .
The output is (pk, sk) ← KGen(1 κ , 1 L ) where (pk, sk) are kept by the client, and pk is sent to the server.
Data Upload Step
In the array upload step the client encrypts its data array x = x [1] given by its binary representation and contains up to w bits. Prior to encryption, to avoid revealing the number of bits in each element the client pads all elements with leading zeros until all of them are of length w. To pad an element without "losing" its leading zeros one can slightly modify the aforementioned padding by adding a single 1 bit next to the MSB position of the element and afterwards add 0 bits up to the desired size. The encryption of each element is then performed bit by bit.
We would like to emphasize that we do not conciser the padding procedure described above as setup. This is due to padding being performed locally element-byelement with only constant additional memory, requiring no processing of the entire plaintext data, and with no reduction in the search time.
Secure Search Step
We specify the secure search step, which is the heart of our protocol (Figure 3, Step III).
The starting point of the secure search protocol is after the client obtained sk, pk, the server obtained pk and the encrypted array We elaborate below on the server's computations (Step III.(b)). We start by specifying how to return a selector array s ∈ {0, 1} n accepting value 1 on entry i * and 0 otherwise (Section 4.3.1), then elaborate on our key algorithm for achieving the former (Section 4.3.2), and finally specify the additional actions for returning the ciphertext for index and element (b * , x[i * ]) (Section 4.3.3).
Binary Raffle for Computing Selector Array s
We specify how the server computes (the encryption of) a selector array s ∈ {0, 1} n accepting value 1 on entry i * and 0 otherwise (Figure 3, Step III.(b) . (1)- (3)).
First (Step III.(b) . (1) 
With probability 1 − ε, the result [[s]] of our randomized algorithm will be the encryption of the step function described above.
Third (Step III.(b) . (3) 
BinaryRaffleStepFunction n,ε Algorithm
We next describe the BinaryRaffleStepFunction n,ε algorithm, which is the heart of our secure search protocol (Figure 3, Step III.(b) . (2)).
The BinaryRaffleStepFunction n,ε algorithm transforms any array v ∈ {0, 1} n of binary values into an array t = (0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ {0, 1} n that contains the step function with value 1 starting from the first index i where v[i] = 1. This algorithm is a randomized Monte Carlo algorithm with failure probability ε (see Figure  4 ). In addition we provide an illustration for the main steps of the algorithm in Figure 2 .
For clarity of presentation we present the algorithm as preforming computations on plaintext values. Modifying the algorithm to apply it on FHE encrypted data is straightforward: simply replace each addition/multiplication operation with its homomorphic counterpart. 
in t will hold the logical OR between the elements in column k of S.
That is, calculate t[k]
(mod 2).
With probability 1 − ε, the output is array t that contains a step function with 0s before index i * and 1s from index i * and onwards. 
Random Partial Prefix Sums
for uniformly random r ∈ {0, 1} n . The parity bit parity(r) is always zero when v = 0 k and it is one with probability half when v = 0 k . By repeating for N (ε) i.i.d. random variables r 1 , . . . , r N (ε) ∈ {0, 1} n (for sufficiently large N (ε)) and computing the OR of the resulting bits parity r 1 , . . . , parity r N (ε) , i.e. computing:
we obtain the desired step-function t = t [1] , . . . , t[n] ∈ {0, 1} n with overwhelming probability.
Returning Index and Element
Finally we specify the additional server's steps for returning the ciphertext for index and element (b * , x[i * ]) that are sent then to the client (Figure 3 ,
Step III.(b). (4)- (5)). . This is because multiplying the matrix B by any array of size n + 1 that contains a single 1 bit in some index j ∈ [n] results in a array of size log 2 n + 1 that holds the binary representation of j (and a array of zeros if j = n + 1).
. Since the problem of privately retrieving a uniquely identifiable element from an encrypted array has efficient FHE based solutions, we first focused above (Sections 3-4.3.2) on the task of computing and returning the encrypted index alone. We next explain how to retrieve also the corresponding element. 
Main Theorem
The advantages and properties of our secure search protocol are given in the following theorem. In particular, the protocol of Figure 3 , when executed on shared parameters (IsMatch, FHE, κ, ε, n, w) and client's input data array
, 1} w and query q, satisfies the following:
1. Correctness: With probability
and b * ∈ {0, 1} log 2 n +1 the binary representation of i * . The server has no output. 2. Complexity of the search step (Step III, Figure 3) Proof. Correctness follows from the correctness of BinaryRaffleStepFunction n,ε algorithm, which holds with probability 1 − ε. Complexity analysis follows by inspection. See the security proof below. Showing that properties 1-10 holds easily follows. Suppose there exists a PPT algorithm A for the query attack game (Section 3.3) . (The case of the data attack game is analogous; details omitted.) We construct a PPT algorithm A for the (single message) IND-CPA game for FHE (see Definition 11.2 in [41] ), and show A has the same advantage as A. By semantic security of FHE we conclude that no PPT adversary A has non-negligible advantage in the former.
The adversary A plays the role of the adversary in the IND-CPA game for FHE, and of the challenger in the query attack game: (1) Upon receiving (pk, sk) ←$ KGen(1 κ ) from the challenger in the IND-CPA game for FHE (C F HE ), A invokes the query attack game with A playing the challenger's role and A the adversary, by sending (pk, sk) to A. (2) Upon receiving from A the array x and two queries q (0) , q (1) , A sends the two queries to C F HE . 
Make IsMatch Great Again!
To demonstrate the strength of our compatibility with generic matching criteria we present versatile matching criteria that can be integrated into our protocol, exhibiting advantageous properties for both performance (Section 5.1) and functionality (Sections 5.2-5.6). We stress that security holds for all examples to follow, due to the server obliviously performing homomorphically operations on ciphertexts; See Theorem 4.1, Section 4.4.
Faster Exact Match via Hashing
To speedup performance in exact match search we propose applying Universal Hashing [9, 38] to reduce the degree and overall multiplications for computing IsMatch from O (w ) to O (log(n/ε)), where w is the elements' size, n the number of elements, and ε the probability of error. This is particularly appealing in use-cases with large elements, specifically, when w > 2 log(2n/ε). See Table 3 , row (iv).
In details, we propose that the server first chooses a uniformly random Toeplitz Matrix A ∈ {0, 1} v×w and a random vector b ∈ {0, 1} v for v = 2 log(2n/ε) to specify a hash function h A (x) = Ax + b mod 2 mapping {0, 1} w to {0, 1} v . The server then homomorphically applies on encrypted values the following equality operator on hashed values:
To analyze the complexity of the above IsMatch polynomial note that this hashing requires solely homomorphic additions operations. So the degree and overall multiplications is d = v and µ = v − 1 respectively. The failure probability due to collision is ε/2.
Note that the above optimization does not contradict the setup-freeness of the whole solution, because the hash function is applied by the server on x while x is already encrypted.
Boolean Logic Queries
The matching criterion in our protocol can express any Boolean logic, such as conjunction, disjunction, negation or their combination. This logic can be applied, for example, on elements' sub-fields (e.g. first and last names in personal records) or characters.
The expression of Boolean logic as a polynomial over GF (2) is via the standard arithmetization techniques: expressing negation by not(a) = 1 − a, conjunction by conj(a 1 , . . . , a t 
The degree d (respectively, overall multiplications µ) is the maximum composition length (respectively, overall number) of disjunction and conjunction operations. See concrete examples in the following sections.
Wild-Card Queries
Wild-card queries are specified by q ∈ {0, 1, * } w . "Wildcard positions" are the entries j where q accepts * . Wildcard match returns is true when x[i] and q agree on all the non wild-card positions.
In case the client is willing to leak the wild-card positions, we simply apply the equality test (see Section 2) on the substrings of x [i] and q corresponding to the non wild-card positions. Complexity is only improved by this (compared to exact match on entire strings).
In case the client wishes to hide the wild-card positions, she can augment the query with the (encrypted) indicator vector I ∈ {0, 1} w accepting 1 on all non wildcard positions, and 0 otherwise. The matching polynomial (to be homomorphically evaluated on encrypted values) is:
for · the entry-wise product.
Correctness follows as on wild-card entries both x[i] and q are turned to 0 to guarantee equality, and they keep their original values on the non wild-card position.
Complexity overhead for the client is |w| additional encryptions. The server evaluates a polynomial with degree increased by 1, and overall number of multiplications increased by an additive term of 2w. Saving a factor of w in the overall multiplication is easy: by replacing each * value in q with 0, and compute IsMatch (x[i] · I, q).
Range Queries
Range queries specify lower and upper boundaries (l, u respectively) to retrieve elements in the range (l, u). I.e., retrieving (i,
Boundaries and data are encrypted by the client.
Range queries are easily implemented as the conjunction of two boundary-tests. Specifically, for elements x[i] in {0, 1} w , the matching polynomial (to be homomorphically evaluated on encrypted values) is:
for IsGrt w and conj operators as in Sections 2 and 5.2.
The complexity of the client is dominated by encrypting |l| + |u| = 2w bits for specifying the query, and by decrypting the outcome. The server's complexity grows with the matching degree and overall multiplications: d = 2(w + 1) and µ = 4w + 1, respectively.
Search In Sub-Array
In sub-array search for IsMatch, the client specifies boundaries l, u ∈ [n] together with the query q in order to retrieve from the server the first match for q in the sub-array
Boundaries, query and data are all encrypted by the client.
A sub-array search is easily computed as the conjunction of three requirements: IsMatch(x[i], q) = 1, i > l, and u > i. Specifically, for indices specified by length m = log n binary representation, the matching polynomial (to be homomorphically evaluated on encrypted values) is:
The complexity overhead compared to the underlying IsMatch (cf. Table 3 ) is as follows. The client's overhead is encrypting |l| + |u| = 2 log(n) additional bits. The server evaluates a matching polynomial with degree and overall multiplications d = d + 2(m + 1) and µ = µ + 4m respectively, for d, µ the degree and overall multiplications for the underlying matching criterion IsMatch. Namely, an additive overhead of O (log n).
We note that to search on a suffix
] of the array it suffices for the client to specify only the lower boundary l and for the server to compute the conjunction of only two conditions: IsMatch(x[i], q) = 1 and i > l. Analogously, for prefix search. This reduces the complexity overhead by a factor of 2.
Sequential Retrieval ("Fetch-Next")
We extend our secure search functionality to return, not only the first match, but also the next matching element (Fetch-Next), with further interaction. I.e. given a match (i, To issue a Fetch-Next query for q, after the client has already retrieved a match (i, x[i]), the client simply sets l to be i. This causes the search to be performed on indices [i + 1, . . . , n] (without revealing the sub-array to the server). This routine can go on until the client receives the response that indicates that there are no more matches (possibly padding with dummy queries). To issue a "fresh" query, the client will simply set l = 0.
The server cannot distinguish between a "fresh" query and a "fetch-next" query as in both cases the index l and query q are encrypted. The amount of elements that match a query q, out of the total number of queries, is not leaked to the server.
Extensions
We overview extensions to our secure search protocol.
Client-Side Amplification
To reduce the server's complexity load due to degree's growth in inverse-error 1/ε, we can employ standard client-side amplification; See [53] Lemma 10.5. Specifically, by setting the protocols error parameter to 0 < ε 0 < 1/2, repeating the protocol in parallel − log 2 (1/ε) log 2 (4ε0 (1−ε0) ) time, and letting the client select the most frequent result, we get error ε but degree growth only with ε 0 ; See Table 3 , row (v).
Dynamic Data Management
The client can have the benefits of dynamic data management: Insert, Update and Delete (see below). She can also execute search and the above commands multiple times and in any order that she wants. Insert: Insertion of additional elements requires the server to append another ciphertext to the end of the encrypted array (here, and throughout this work, we assume that the size of the array n is known to the server, see Section 3. 
. Delete: Deletion of elements can be achieved by updating them to a reserved "Deleted" symbol. Another option is switching the value of the element we wish to delete to that of the last element in the array and reducing the number of elements n by 1 (for cases when the dynamic value of n is either maintained by the client, or is not a secret and can be kept with the server).
Conclusions
In this work we presented a new and improved solution for secure search on FHE encrypted data. Our solution improves over the prior state-of-the-art of setupfree searching on FHE encrypted data in being: (1) postprocessing free and with negligible error probability, (2) faster for both client and server, and (3) compatible with all FHE candidates. We implemented our secure search protocol and performed extensive benchmarks showing concrete run-time speedup by an order of magnitude.
A Protocols' Summary
See Figure 3 and Figure 4 .
B Experimental Results
In this section we describe in detail the benchmarks performed to evaluate our Binary Raffle protocol and discuss our results. As a reference point, we executed benchmarks on an implementation of the SPiRiT protocol [2] , the state-of-the-art secure search solution directly related to our FHE based protocol. We evaluated both the deterministic and randomized variants of SPiRiT.
We first present benchmarks with the same matching criteria predicate IsMatch as in [2] : IsEqual (see Equation 1, Section 2). Additionally, is Section B.3.5, we give selected benchmarks results for several other matching criteria (see more details in Section 5).
B.1 Experimental Setup
We executed the protocols on top of the HElib C++ library [31] that was compiled with NTL [52] running over GMP [28] . We utilized a single Ubuntu Server 16.04.4 LTS Linux machine with Intel Xeon E7-4870 CPU running at 2.40GHz on 16 cores, 30MB Cache and 16GB RAM.
Parallelization and SIMD
In all experiments we utilized all available CPU cores by dividing the input array into equally sized segments that were processed by each core. After completing its execution, every core returned the first matched index candidate for its array segment. Let B ∈ {0, 1} ( log 2 n +1)×n be the matrix that contains in each column k ∈ [n] the binary representation of k.
Fig. 3. Binary Raffle Secure Search Protocol
We also took advantage of HElib's SIMD [54] capabilities and "packed" multiple plaintext values (at least 500) into each ciphertext. We remark that we did not attempt to optimize the SIMD factor besides setting its minimal required value. By slight modification of HElib's level parameter it is often possible to reach much higher SIMD factors, around several thousands.
To summarize, with each CPU core executed the protocol on an input array of n ciphertexts, the total amount of elements processed in each experiment is given by n = n · SIMD · CORES and the client obtained in the end of the experiment SIMD · CORES results.
B.2 Experiments Description
Binary Raffle. Our main focus in Binary Raffle's benchmarks was to evaluate the running-time of the protocol as a parameter of total input array size (n ), word width (i.e. bit length w) and error probability (ε).
For word widths of w > 1 we use the equality operator (see Equation 1, Section 2) as the selected IsMatch predicate. Beyond that, we also experiment on elements with single bit (w = 1). These experiments on w = 1 were meant to filter out the running-time of evaluating the IsMatch polynomial on all elements (step (2.a) in Figure 3 ) from the remaining steps of protocol. This can be thought as using an IsMatch predicate that is the degenerate identity function that does nothing, in order to evaluate the performance of the rest of the protocol on a binary vector of indicators.
For w ∈ {16, 64} input array sizes ranged up to n ≈ 3 · 10 6 elements. For w = 1 input array sizes ranged up to n ≈ 20 · 10 6 elements.
The failure probabilities we experimented with were ε ∈ {2 −80 , 2 −40 , 2 −20 , 2 −10 , 2 −1 }. Regarding above failure probabilities, ε ∈ {2 −80 , 2 −40 } can be viewed as a negligible error probability, and any ε > 2 −1 as an error probability that allows standard probability amplification (see Section 6.1).
SPiRiT. As mentioned, we used an implementation of SPiRiT as a reference point. On array of sizes n = n · SIMD · CORES, the deterministic variant was evaluated using k = log 2 n/ log log n sequential executions for different primes larger then log n. We would like to mention that we did not parallelize these k executions as we already exhausted all available employed parallelism to partition the input array into segments assigned to each CPU core. Similarly to Binary Raffle, SPiRiT was executed on elements with w = 1. Additionaly, due to relatively low
B.3.4 Impact of Word Size (w) on Binary Raffle
We executed Binary Raffle with both w ∈ {1, 64} and observed the effect on run time performance (Figures 5g  and 5h) .
As opposed to the previous section, in this section the change in execution time is more noticeable as word size w increases. When going from a single bit to 64 bit words the difference in execution is around ×20 − ×40 for error probability half and around ×2 for negligible error probability (ε = 2 −80 ).
This can be explained by the linear dependence between word size w and both degree and overall multiplications of the polynomial executed by the server during the Binary Raffle protocol.
This observation brings into being our improvement to the Binary Raffle protocol specified in section 5.1.
B.3.5 Other Matching Criteria
The benchmarks below were performed with the same setup described in Section B.1 with the exception of using a server with different CPU (less cores yet each core more powerful): Intel Core i7-4790 CPU running at 3.60GHz on 8 cores, 8MB Cache and 16GB RAM.
Experiment 1 was the conjunction between two equality queries over an array with two w = 64 bit subfields (see Section 5.2). Experiment 2 was a range query, with lower and upper values restriction, over an array with w = 64 bit unsigned integers (see Section 5.4). Experiment 3 was of equality queries over an array with w = 64 bit with 32 publicly known wildcard positions (see Section 5.3). The results are presented in Table 4 .
In the results one can clearly see the relative overhead of the additional multiplications performed during the execution of IsGrt 64 (Equation 2, Section 2) in the second experiment compared to IsEqual 64 (Equation 1, Section 2) in the first experiment. Similarly, the third experiment, in which the matching criteria includes execution of solely IsEqual 32 , is even faster than the two previous experiments. 
